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This paper seeks to determine if REIT equity and debt offerings depend on 
capital market conditions. Specifically, we utilize a vector autoregressive (VAR) 
model to analyze the relationship between capital issues of REITs and relevant capital 
market conditions to see whether market timing behavior is supported. In addition, we 
seek to understand the fundamental mechanism behind the market timing behavior 
where we test two different hypotheses of market timing- the information-based 
market timing and market inefficiency-based market timing. Last but not least, we 
examine the security choice of REITs to test between different capital structure 
theories- trade-off theory, pecking-order theory and market timing theory. 
 
     The empirical results from 1980 through 2004 support market timing in REIT 
equity and debt issues. In addition, support is also found for the information-based 
market timing theory for equity offerings and backward looking market timing in debt 
issuances. Our results have two implications. First, although REITs are relatively 
more transparent than industrial firms, REITs managers still could time the equity 
market. Asymmetric information and adverse selection still exist for REITs, but with 
less obvious timing patterns. Second, the absence of long-run return anomaly after 
SEOs of REITs means that the market efficiency is not violated. This is different from 
studies about general stocks, in which the market inefficiency-based market timing is 
preferred compared to the information-based market timing. With regard to the debt 
 1
issuances, two hypotheses are tested- backward-looking and forward-looking, and 
backward-looking debt market timing is supported. 
 
In addition, we find that, although market conditions are important in the security 
choice of REITs, they are not the only factors that determine the capital structure 
changes of REITs. Firm characteristics, such as size, leverage, debt capacity, etc, all 
have significant effects on the financing activities of REITs. The trade-off theory and 
the pecking-order theory, also find partial support from our analysis. We conclude 
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Recent evidence in capital structure research has supported the market timing 
explanation for capital structure where capital financing decisions depend on capital 
market conditions (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are typically excluded in studies for general stocks 
as they are special investment vehicles. This study links market timing with REITs to 
understand the capital financing and capital structure changes of REITs. An 
introduction to different capital structure theories, including the market timing theory, 
and a description of REITs is given in this chapter. Then the research objective and 
the organization of this study are introduced. 
 
1. 1 Capital Structure Theories 
 
The development of capital structure theories starts with the capital structure 
irrelevance theory, which was developed by Modigliani and Miller in 1958. This 
theory is based on a number of assumptions, which include: (1) capital markets are 
frictionless, (2) individuals can borrow and lend at the risk free rate, (3) there are no 
bankruptcy costs, (4) firms only issue risk-free debt and risky equity, (5) all firms are 
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in the same risk class, (6) there are no personal taxes, (7) all cash flows are 
perpetuities, (8) information is symmetric, and (9) managers always maximize 
shareholders’ wealth. Based on above assumptions, the MM model concludes that 
the capital structure of the firm is irrelevant and does not influence the market value 
of the firm.  
 
However, in the real world, taxes and bankrupt costs exist and firms are 
leveraged. This means that some assumptions of the MM propositions should be 
relaxed if the real world situations are considered. With corrections to the capital 
structure theory, capital structure is no longer irrelevant to the firm value. There is a 
trade-off between the tax benefits of debt and the bankruptcy risk, and there is an 
optimal capital structure for firms, although this optimal capital structure may be 
unobservable. This is the trade-off theory. Trade-off theory is still a very important 
capital structure theory in corporate finance. 
 
Instead of the trade-off between tax benefits of debt and the bankruptcy risk, the 
information asymmetry between firm managers and investors is the primary 
determinant of capital structure changes according to the pecking-order theory. 
Managers are assumed to act in interest of “old” shareholders, and choose not to 
issue equity when the prospects of the firms are good. Investors, who have less 
information about firms than managers, will consider the financing decisions made 
by managers as signals. Equity issues made by managers are bad signals that indicate 
bad news about the firms. So managers avoid issuing equity if they have internal 
capital or they could issue debt. The pecking order for managers is first internal 
capital, then debt, and the last resort is equity. 
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 The market timing theory is a dynamic capital structure theory and implies that 
managers make financing decisions according to the capital market conditions. 
Generally, managers will issue equity when their stocks are overvalued and issue 
debt when interest rates are low. The market timing concept is also supported by the 
long-run underperformance of stocks after initial public offerings or secondary 
equity offerings compared to non issuing stocks. 
 
The market timing theory is different from traditional capital structure theories 
not only because it examines the capital structure changes from the capital market 
perspective, but also it relaxes the assumption of the market efficiency. As one 
important capital structure theory, the market timing concept is being studied by 
more and more researchers. However, most of these studies concentrate on the 
timing behavior of general stocks. REITs are always excluded in general corporate 
research. In this study, we choose REITs as the research focus and examine the 
market timing and capital structure changes of REITs.  
 
1.2 About Real Estate Investment Trust  
 
According to the definition given by National Association of Real Estate 
Investment Trust (NAREIT), Real Estate Investment Trust, or REIT is a company 
that owns, and in most cases, operates income-producing real estate. REITs are 
created to give smaller investors the ability to invest in large-scale commercial 
properties. During the past decades, REITs have grown dramatically in size and 
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importance in both U.S. and other countries. Among all the REITs in different 
countries, US REITs have the longest history and are the most developed.  
 
US REITs were created in the 1960’s by the Congress and aimed at facilitating 
the investment in large-scale real estate. The market capitalization of REITs has 
increased from 1,494.3 millions of dollars in 1971 to 307,894.73 millions of dollars 
in 2004 (with reference to the Appendix). The total number of REITs also increased 
from 34 to 193 during the period. Besides the rapid growth, REITs also have good 
investment performance and attracted more and more investors, especially since 
1990’s. REITs are generally considered as total return investments with high 
dividends and long-term capital appreciation. The attractive risk/reward tradeoff 
offered by REITs, the low correlation between REITs returns and other asset classes, 
and the diversification offered by REITs to the investment portfolio, are the reasons 
of the popularity of REITs. 
 
We examine the market timing of REITs, which are usually not included in the 
studies for general stocks as they are special investment vehicles. However, it is 
precisely because REITs are special vehicles that make them more interesting test 
bed for alternative capital structure explanations. This is for several reasons. First, 
because REITs face higher dividend payout requirements, they have to look to 
external funding for capital investment and asset acquisitions and capital structure 
adjustments (Brown and Riddiough, 2003). Second, the higher tangibility of REITs 
assets and better predictability of cash flows imply that less asymmetric information 
is expected from REITs compared to industrial stocks. Given that asymmetric 
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information is fundamental to capital structure theories, evidence from the REIT 
industry would provide even stronger support for information-based theories. 
 
There are three different types of US REITs: equity REITs, mortgage REITs 
and hybrid REITs. We choose equity REITs because equity REITs own or have an 
equity interest in rental real estate, and the operation of equity REITs are close to 
general stocks. Mortgage REITs, which make or own loans and other obligations that 
are secured by real estate collateral, and hybrid REITs, which combine the 
investment strategies of equity REITs and mortgage REITs, are excluded from this 
study. At the same time, equity REITs take the largest market share of the whole US 
REITs market (Refer to the Appendix). The REITs mentioned in following parts of 
the study represent equity REITs. 
 
1.3 Research Objective 
 
The focus of this study is on testing the market timing and capital structure 
changes of US equity REITs. The first research question is: do REITs time the 
market in their capital issues? If the answer is yes, what is the underlying mechanism 
of this timing behavior, the information-based market timing or market inefficiency-
based market timing? The answer to the above research questions could help us learn 
more about the performance of REITs around capital issues. Investors could choose 
their investment strategies if they have better knowledge of the performance of 
REITs, and REITs managers and practitioners could learn from others and know 
what is happening in the REITs industry. For researchers, the findings of this study 
could help develop the relevant capital structure theory. 
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 The second part of the study examines the security choice of REITs against 
different capital structure theories. The key question in this part is: which capital 
structure theory could be used to explain the security choice of REITs, trade-off 
theory, pecking-order theory or market timing theory? The answer to this question 
allows us to understand the influences of market conditions (according to market 
timing theory), and the asymmetric information between investors and REITs 
managers (according to the pecking-order theory), and the bankruptcy risk 
(according to the trade-off theory) on the security choice of REITs. At the same time, 
the security choice of REITs offers a new test ground of different capital structure 
theories because REITs have little retained earnings to resort to.  
  
1.4 Organization of the Study 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the related literature to the topic of this study. The research 
methods and data sources are introduced in Chapter 3. The analysis of market timing 
of REITs is carried out in Chapter 4. Whether there is market timing behavior in 
REITs security offerings, and whether this behavior is supported by asymmetric 
information or market inefficiency are studied. Chapter 5 examines the security 
choice of REITs and tries to understand which capital structure theory could be used 









2.1 Trade-off theory and pecking order theory 
 
The trade-off theory implies that there should be an optimal debt level, although 
this optimal debt level is not directly observable, and could vary through time. 
Empirical evidence that supports the trade-off theory and the optimal capital structure 
comes from Schwartz and Aronson (1967), Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), etc. With 
regard to the security choice that we analyze in the empirical part of this study, the 
trade-off theory implies that all capital financing decisions are made to adjust the 
leverage ratio to the optimal leverage ratio. 
 
For pecking order theory, firms do not need to keep a target debt level. The 
driving forces of the capital structure changes of firms are the financing needs of 
investment opportunities. The pecking order theory is developed by Myers and Majluf 
(1984) in which there is no well-defined optimal capital structure. When there is a 
good investment opportunity, managers would avoid using equity to finance the 
investment, because equity issues would jeopardize the benefits of current 
shareholders even if the investment is profitable. The result is that when facing capital 
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needs, managers would use internal funds first. If there are not enough internal funds, 
they would use debt. Equity is the last resort in the financing activity. This pecking 
order that firms follow in choosing financing resources explains why more profitable 
firms borrow less: because they have more internal funds.  
 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) attempts to differentiate between the pecking 
order theory and the static trade-off theory. Based on the premise that changes in debt 
ratios result from the need for external funds rather than a desire to maintain an 
optimal capital structure, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) estimate the need for 
funds as cash flow deficits. They also test the static trade-off theory by regressing the 
difference in the previous period’s debt from the firm’s target debt level on the 
amount of debt issued or retired. What they find is that the pecking order model has 
superior explanatory power. 
 
Chirinko and Singha (2000) improve on Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)’s 
work by considering equity issues and debt capacity of firms. Their result could not 
reject the pecking order theory, and alternative tests are needed. The Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers model is also examined by Frank and Goyal (2003) with more current data. 
They did not find evidence consistent with the adverse selection and the asymmetric 
information implications of the pecking order theory. With the data of the financing 
choices of firms that had recently gone public, Helwege and Liang (1996) found no 
evidence of a clear pecking order for firms to raise external capital.  
 
Aside from direct studies of the pecking order theory, the announcement effects 
of the financing decisions are also studied to test the pecking order hypothesis. Under 
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the pecking order theory, the announcement of a secondary equity offering (SEO) is 
perceived as a negative signal by investors, which leads to negative reactions of 
investors at the announcement of new stock issues. As debt is less sensitive to 
information asymmetry, the announcement of a risk debt issue is somewhat less 
negative. 
  
Harris and Raviv (1991) find evidence consistent with the pecking order theory 
with the documentation of significant negative announcement effects for SEOs and 
insignificant effects for debt issues. In more recent literature, Jung, Kim and Stulz 
(1996) find mixed evidence on the pecking order with negative announcement returns 
for stocks and insignificant returns for debts. What they also find is, even with debt 
capacity, some firms use equity to fund good investment opportunities, which is 
inconsistent with the pecking order hypothesis. D’ Mello and Ferris (2000) find 
support of the pecking order theory, as more negative announcement period returns 
are observed for firms with more severe information asymmetry.  
 
The market reaction to capital offerings of REITs is studied by Howe and 
Shilling (1988), in which paper, negative equity-issuance effect is found by REITs. 
Similarly, in Francis, Lys and Vincent (2004), reaction to REITs equity offerings is 
also found to be negative, although more favorable than reaction to industrial equity 
offerings. The asymmetric information is believed to be an important factor in 
determining the reaction. 
 
2.2 Market timing theory 
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In the Graham and Harvey (2001) survey involving of CFOs, it is found that 
more than two thirds of the managers issue equity when it is overvalued and would 
issue debt when the interest rates are low. This empirical evidence offers direct 
support to the market timing theory. Market timing theory implies that firms make 
capital financing decisions according to the capital market conditions. Equity market 
timing means that equity issues decisions are made according to the stock prices, and 
debt market timing means that debt issuing decisions are made based on the interest 
rate levels. The optimal leverage ratio does not exist in the market timing theory. 
According to the market timing theory, the security choice of REITs depends on the 
market conditions, which means that choosing equity or debt is not fixed with some 
order. 
 
Research findings about equity and debt market timing are different. Equity 
market timing gains supports from two different timing theories: information-based 
market timing and market inefficiency-based market timing. Studies of information-
based equity timing theory were carried out by Lucas and McDonald (1990), 
Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1991) and Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1992). 
These studies focus on the variations of adverse selection costs of equity issues with 
the existence of asymmetric information. Since the equity issues only occur when the 
stock prices are overvalued, the stock prices would decrease on announcement of the 
equity issues. Outsiders would lower their evaluation of the issuing firm’s quality, and 
this creates a “lemons market” in new equity issues. In Korajczyk, Lucas and 
McDonald (1991) and Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1992), the asymmetric 
information is not fixed over time, and firms tend to issue equity when the market is 
most informed about the quality of the firm, for example, after earnings releases. They 
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find that managers can control the informational disadvantage of the market by 
choosing the timing of an equity issue, which is called market timing.  
 
The market inefficiency-based equity market timing arises from the long-run 
performance study after equity issues. The underperformances after IPO (Ritter, 1991), 
the long-run underperformances after equity issues (Loughran and Ritter, 1995), etc. 
seem to indicate that market timing is the only explanation for the long-run 
performance anomaly after equity issues. The anomalies observed come from the 
timing of inefficient capital markets. Besides the market timing behavior of managers 
before equity issues, other corporate decisions, for example spin-offs, debt offerings, 
and stock splits also exhibit long-run abnormal returns (Desai and Jain (1999), Spiess 
and Affleck-Graves (1999), and Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996)).  
 
At the same time, some doubts are also cast on this version of market 
inefficiency. Other researchers also performed similar tests but they do not find strong 
evidence against market efficiency (Fama and French (1988) and Kothari and 
Shanken (1997)). Besides, on-going debate exists to give methodological suggestions 
on the long-run anomaly (Fama (1998), Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000), and Brav, 
Geczy, and Gompers (2000)). The robustness of the long-run returns calculations are 
questioned by researchers.  
 
In Baker and Wurgler (2002), the equity market timing theory gained strong 
support by finding that market timing has persistent effects on the capital structure, 
and the capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity 
market. The market-to-book ratio is used to measure the market timing opportunities 
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perceived by managers and managers are believed to time the market in equity issues. 
In addition, Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that leverage is strongly negatively related 
to the market-to-book ratio. Since trade-off theory and pecking-order theory could not 
be used to explain this long-run relationship, it is believed that market timing is the 
only plausible explanation. However, the underlying reason of this result is not clear 
in Baker and Wurgler (2002).  
 
Both two versions of equity market timing could be used to explain this long-run 
relationship between leverage and market-to-book ratio. In the information-based 
market timing, which is the dynamic version of Myers and Majluf (1984), the market-
to-book ratio is inversely related to adverse selection, and temporary fluctuations in 
the market-to-book ratio measure variations in adverse selection. The second equity 
market timing theory assumes that managers believe that they can time the equity 
market and issue equity when they perceive that investors overvalue the firm. The 
market-to-book ratio is a proxy of market misevaluations. As market-to-book ratio 
could represent both adverse selection and market misevaluations, Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) could not tell which market timing theory dominates.  
  
With regard to the debt market timing, Guedes and Opler (1996) find that the 
maturity of issues is negatively related to the term spread. Baker, Greenwood and 
Wurgler (2003) also support the market timing theory by finding that firms tend to 
issue long-term debt when inflation is low and term spread is narrow. On the other 
hand, firms issue short-term debt when inflation is high and term spread is wide. 
Barry et al. (2003) investigate the debt issuing decision of firms in relation to 
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historical interest rates, and conclude that the amounts and numbers of debt issues are 
higher when current interest rate is lower compared to historical interest rates. 
 
However, most of these studies concentrate on the timing behavior of general 
stocks. REITs are always excluded in general corporate research. In this study, we 
choose REITs as the research focus and examine the market timing and capital 
structure changes of REITs.  
 
REITs are chosen as the focus of study because they are quite different from 
general stocks in the following aspects. First, REITs are highly correlated with real 
estate properties. The heavy dependence of real properties on capital has 
differentiated REITs from other stocks. Second, US REITs are required to pay out at 
least 90% of the taxable income to shareholders. Such a high dividend payout 
requirement may influence the finance decisions of REITs managers as there would 
be less retained earnings for REITs. Third, as a kind of indirect investment tool, 
REITs are required to disclose more information about the firm performance 
compared to general listed firms. The more information is disclosed, the less 
asymmetric information is expected between REITs managers and investors. Under 
this condition, what kind of influence does the information asymmetry have on the 
equity issues of REITs? All the above differences between REITs and general stocks 
make the capital structure changes of REITs more interesting and distinctive. 
 
Previous studies on REIT capital structure changes include Brown and 
Riddiough (2003), who analyze the public financial offerings of equity REITs. They 
find that equity offerings are more likely to be used for investment, while debt 
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offerings are normally used for adjusting the capital structure. A probit model is used 
to examine the choice to issue public debt versus equity. It is found that a firm’s asset, 
liability and income structure is related to the REIT’s decision whether to issue public 
debt or equity. When facing the choice between equity and debt, REITs with higher 
debt levels would choose not to issue public debt. The larger the REIT, the more 
likely it would issue debt. This paper examines the capital structure changes of REITs, 
taking into account different characteristics of REITs, but the market timing theory is 
not tested. Instead, this paper focuses on testing classic capital structure theories.  
 
Previous research works about the market timing behavior of REITs include Li 
and Ooi (2004). They find that US REITs time both the equity and debt market 
conditions using a sample of equity REITs from 1986 to 2003. The M/B ratio is 
considered as the proxy of market misevaluations and equity/debt issues/repurchases 
are analyzed. They conclude that REITs time the market in both equity and debt 
offerings. However, neither asymmetric information nor market inefficiency 
assumptions are tested in their study. At the same time, their conclusions are based on 
separate studies of equity and debt offerings.  
 
Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans (2004) use the same research methodology as Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) to examine the relationship between market-to-book and leverage 
ratios of REITs. They find that REITs with high market-to-book ratios have high 
leverage ratios and historical market-to-book has long-term persistent impact on 
current leverage ratio. Pecking order theory is believed to be more relevant in 
explaining REITs capital structure theories. Their study is similar to Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), in which two versions of market timing could not be differentiated. 
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 In this paper, both the equity and debt market timing of REITs are tested. Then 
hypotheses from both the information-based and market inefficiency-based equity 
market timing are tested to see which theory could be used to explain the equity 
market timing of REITs. Last but not least, to understand the capital structure changes 
of REITs more clearly, we include three capital structure theories (trade-off theory, 
pecking order and market timing) in our probit model to test the financing pattern and 
security choice of REITs. Our study is complementary to previous literature in REITs 
capital structure studies. 
 
This study seeks to make four contributions to the extant literature. First we test 
whether market timing exists for REITs by evaluating if REITs capital issues depend 
on capital market conditions. A vector autoregressive (VAR) model is applied as it 
allows us to know how capital structure changes. Typically, the total leverage ratio is 
examined to test different capital structure theories. Focusing on the leverage ratio 
could not, however, differentiate between different capital-structure adjustment paths. 
For example, debt issues and equity repurchases have the same effect on the capital 
structure ratios. If we use the total leverage ratio, then it is impossible to know which 
adjustment path is used by REITs. With VAR model, we could overcome this 
shortcoming and keep track of the changes of both equity and debt. Another 
advantage of the VAR model is the choice of the variables does not to be determined 
before estimation. This is allows more relevant variables to be included in the 
regression. A detailed description of the VAR model is given in Chapter 3.   
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The second contribution is to examine the short-run and long-run performance of 
REITs after equity issues to test the hypotheses of information-based market timing 
theory (Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald, 1991) and market inefficiency-based market 
timing theory (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). According to market timing under the 
asymmetric information framework, managers have superior information about the 
stock prices compared to investors. Under such conditions, managers choose to issue 
equity when the stock prices are overvalued and repurchase them when stock prices 
are undervalued. Thus the positive abnormal returns preceding the equity issues 
would be used as one method to test the market timing abilities. If managers could 
time the market when they issue the equity, the stock prices should be increasing 
before the equity issues. As the stock prices have reached its peak when new equity is 
issues, the stock prices would decline at the announcement or issues of the new shares. 
Another hypothesis is that managers would choose to issue equity when the market is 
best informed of the quality of the firm to reduce the adverse selection problem. 
 
The market inefficiency-based market timing theory is supported by the long-run 
return anomaly after equity issues as documented by Ritter (1991) and Loughran and 
Ritter (1995). To test whether the market efficiency is challenged by REITs equity 
issues, the long-run performance after secondary equity issues of REITs is tested. 
Previous research findings about the long-run performance of REITs SEOs include 
Howton, Howton and Friday (2000), which found long-run underperformance of 
REITs SEOs when comparing the holding period return of equity issuing REITs with 
non-equity offering REITs. The method applied by Howton, Howton and Friday 
(2000) is to compares equity issuing REITs with non-equity offering REITs. As most 
of the REITs (91 out of 123) in the sample have at least one equity offering during the 
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study period, we will use the Fama and French four factor model to calculate the long-
term returns. This approach is preferred over the Horton et al.’s approach in that we 
control for relevant risk factors. 
 
       Our third contribution is to examine the factors influencing the choice of debt 
offering by REITs. In particular, we appeal to the idea that the current level of interest 
rates in relation to the past history of interest rates matters in debt market timing, and 
that managers are backward-looking. We also test the forward-looking debt market 
timing hypothesis by examining whether interest rates rise after REITs issue debt. 
 
The fourth contribution is to differentiate between competing capital structure 
theories by examining the security choice of REITs when financing decisions are 
made. Which security type to choose when firms need external capital, equity or debt? 
Different capital structure theories have different assumptions and explanations.  
 
Trade-off theory implies that all capital financing decisions are made to adjust 
the leverage ratio to the optimal leverage ratio, and the optimal leverage ratio is 
correlated with the bankruptcy costs. The pecking-order theory suggests that should 
firms need external capital, they would use debt first, as debt suffers less asymmetric 
information problem. The market timing theory focuses on the capital market 
conditions and implies that firms would choose one type of security when it is 
relatively “cheap”. 
 
As motivated earlier, REITs offer a good test ground of the security choice 
because REITs have high dividend payout requirements, and limited retained earnings 
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availability. Such restrictions effectively limit the security choice of REITs to issue 
either equity or debt. As such, we differentiate between the different capital structure 
theories by examining the security choice of REITs between equity and debt. This 























 Chapter 3 
 
Research Methods and Data Sources 
   
3.1 VAR model 
    
The VAR model is employed to test the relationship between relevant variables 
to examine the market timing behavior of REITs in Chapter 4. Now we briefly 
introduce the models here. The autoregressive model is 
 
tptptt yyy εττµ ++++= −− L11                                                                 (1) 
 
Where tε  is a vector of non-autocorrelated disturbances with zero means and 
contemporaneous covariance matrix [ ] Ω='ttE εε . This equation system is a vector 
autoregression, or VAR. Vector means that we are dealing with a vector of variables 
while autoregressive means the appearance of the lagged value of the dependent 
variable. 
Akaike or Schwarz Criterion can be used to decide how many lags to take.  
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One of the virtues of the VAR is that it obviates a decision as to what 
contemporaneous variables are exogenous; it has only lagged (predetermined) 
variables on the right-hand side, and all the variables are endogenous (although in 
some circumstances exogenous variables can also be included). VARs are special, 
because in simultaneous or structural equation models, the equations in the system 
should be determined before the estimation of the model. This kind of identification is 
often subjective. Using VAR this subjectivity could be avoided.  
 
Employing VAR model allows us to test which variables are more relevant in 
determining the equity issues or stock returns, and we do not need to specify the 
relationships before the estimation. VARs have been used primarily in 
macroeconomics for forecasting. Besides, VARs can also be used for testing Granger 
Causality and studying the effects of the policy. 
 
Although VAR model has many advantages, critics of VAR point out that some 
problems exist in VAR modeling: 
(1) VAR model is a-theoretic because it lacks prior information. 
(2) Although VAR model is good at forecasting, it is not suitable for policy 
analysis. 
(3) Choosing the appropriate lag length is not very easy. 
(4) Strictly speaking, all the variables should be stationary. If not, we have to 
transform the data to stationary ones. 
  
3.2 Probit Model 
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In Chapter 5, a probit model is used to examine the security choice of REITs. 
The probit model is used when the dependent variable is a binary variable, and the 
probit model could be used to predict the dependent variable on the basis of 
independent variables. 
 
The probit regression equation is: 
 
)'()1Pr( bxFy ii ==                                                                             (2)                                                      
 
Here b is a parameter to be estimated, and F is the normal cumulative distribution 
function of the standard normal distribution, as shown in the following figure. 
 
Figure 1 Cumulative Normal Distribution  
 
 




εβ +=∗ 'xy ,                                                                                (3) 
 
And suppose that Y is an indicator for whether the latent variable y* is positive, 
then it is easy to show that 
 
)'()1Pr( bxFy ii ==                                                                     (4) 
 
The coefficients of the probit model can be estimated using maximum likelihood 
estimation instead of ordinary least squares. Maximum likelihood estimation is a 
method for estimating the parameters of the population from which sample data is 
drawn, and the maximum likelihood estimate is the parameter associated with the 
highest probability of observing the sample statistic.  
 
In our test, y=0 when equity issues are made and y=1 when debt issues are made. 
The coefficient of the model represents the effect of changes of the independent 
variables (such as market conditions, REITs characteristics, etc) on the probability of 
debt/equity issues. 
 
3.3 Data Sources 
 
All the US equity REITs captured in this study are reported by National 
Association of Real Estate Investment Trust. US REITs are of relatively long history, 
and this allows us to know the capital structure theories in more developed REITs 
markets. There are 123 equity REITs captured in this study, which comprise a great 
majority of the equity REITs reported by NAREIT.  
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1980 1 9 0 0 14 
1981 1 4 0 0 20 
1982 1 32 0 0 21 
1983 1 12 0 0 22 
1984 0 0 0 0 22 
1985 1 18 2 55 27 
1986 5 164 3 100 30 
1987 0 0 1 100 35 
1988 1 33 1 60 36 
1989 3 122 0 0 38 
1990 1 77 1 34 39 
1991 3 114 0 0 41 
1992 6 342 0 0 44 
1993 13 1171 5 531 56 
1994 15 1203 8 88 87 
1995 25 2425 9 457 91 
1996 43 5548 19 1172 96 
1997 85 9198 42 1749 104 
1998 91 4834 65 4957 112 
1999 5 785 35 4234 113 
2000 3 668 27 1651 113 
2001 32 3252 15 2643 113 
2002 25 2606 39 4849 118 
2003 45 3727 36 3245 123 
2004 18 1896 18 2550 123 
 
 
Quarterly REITs cash flow data comes from Compustat database and daily price 
data are extracted from CRSP. The dates of first public announcement of quarterly 
earnings are extracted from Compustat database. The record of all equity and debt 
issues of REITs (excluding IPOs) comes from the Securities Database Corporation 
(SDC) database. Long-term interest rate is obtained from the website of U.S. Federal 
Reserve Board and the data of NAREIT equity REITs price index from NAREIT. The 
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data of equity REITs that are captured spread from January 1980 to March 2004, 279 
months in total.  
 
The sample of REITs SEOs obtained from the SDC database includes equity 
REITs SEOs between January 1980 and March 2004. The final sample contains 424 
SEOs from 91 REITs. The final sample of REITs debt offerings includes 326 debt 


















                                                 
1 The final sample considers multiple debt issues of a REIT made at the same day as a single issue. 
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 Chapter 4  
 
Market Timing of REITs 
   
This chapter is composed of four sections of empirical analyses- examination the 
market timing in REITs capital financing activities, testing hypotheses of information-
based market timing, testing hypotheses of market inefficiency-based market timing 
and then the debt market timing..  
 
4.1 The equity and debt market timing of REITs 
 
Equity market timing theory implies that managers choose to issue equity when 
their stock prices are (or believed to be) overvalued and repurchase the stocks when 
they are (or believed to be) undervalued. Thus equity issues always occur after 
positive stock returns. Debt market timing implies that debt issues are made when the 
interest rates are low. We employ the VAR model here to find whether there is market 
timing in REITs capital issues. For REITs captured in this part, the following 
hypotheses are tested: will net capital issuing decisions be made according to the 
capital market conditions? 


















                                                                                                                     (5) 
The variables are: 
tEquity : Net change in equity of all the equity REITs in quarter t; 
tDebt : Net change in book value of long-term debt
2 of all the equity REITs in quarter 
t; 
tNAREIT : The NAREIT equity REIT index return in quarter t: 
tI : The long-term interest rate in quarter t; 
tSP : S&P 500 composite index return in quarter t; 
:tTS The term-spread between long-term interest rate and short-term interest rate in 
quarter t; 
tAVMB : The average of the M/B ratio of all the equity REITs in quarter t. 
 
      The detailed explanations of these variables are: 
(a) Market value of equity= price closed at the end of the third month of each quarter 
*        shares outstanding (splits adjusted) 
(b)  Long-term debt= total long-term debt  
(c) Market-to-book ratio= market value of assets/ total assets= (market value of equity 
+ long-term debt+ preferred stock + debt in current liabilities)/total assets 
(d)  Long-term interest rate= 10 year interest rate per year (%) 
 
                                                 
2 As long-term debt is believed to be closely correlated with the long-term interest rate in market timing, we use 
long-term debt as the proxy for debt. As a robust test, the total debt is also included in the VAR model. The results 
are qualitatively unchanged.. 
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The statistical summary of some cross sectional variables is listed in the 
following Table. The vast majority of the debt issues by equity REITs are fixed-rate 
issues. The time series description of the S & P500 index return and the 10-year 
interest rate is plotted in Appendix. 
 
The VAR model is estimated with panel data. Because of the special 
characteristics of the panel data, individual heterogeneity should be considered and 
appropriate econometric techniques should be applied. Then the data from different 
observations could be pooled to estimate the coefficient. Holtz-Eakin, Newey and 
Rosen (1988) give detailed technical explanation about using panel data in VAR 
model.  
 
The VAR model results are listed in Table 43. It is evident from Table 4 column 
1 that REIT index returns in the previous quarters have positive effects on equity 
issues. When the stock price of the REIT market is increasing, REIT equity issues are 
more likely. This is consistent with the market timing theory. 
 
Another finding is that the equity issues have negative effects on the stock return 
in the subsequent quarters, although such effects are not significant. This can be 
observed from the last column in Table 4, where the NAREIT return is the dependent 
variable. This negative effect implies that equity offerings are made when stock prices 
are peaking. These results indicate that equity market prices are important for equity 
financing decisions of REITs. Similar findings were made in Baker and Wurgler 
(2000)-the equity share in the total equity and debt issues is a good predictor of future 
                                                 
3 Unit root tests are carried out to make sure all the variables included in the regression are stationary. 
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aggregate market returns. Higher equity share will lead to lower stock returns in the 
future. Our findings are complementary to Baker and Wurgler (2000) as we find the 
negative relationship between current equity issues and future market returns is also 
valid for the REIT sector. 
 
Next we examine the effects of the interest rates on the issues of debt. We find 
that increasing interest rate leads to decrease of debt issues (column 2).In other words, 
REITs also time the debt market. This is consistent with one of the conclusions of Li 
and Ooi (2001). The above tests clearly show that market timing behavior exist in 
REIT financing activities4. Put differently, capital market conditions are important 
determinants of the capital issues of REITs. 
 
In order to better understand the market timing of REITs, we seek to determine 
the fundamental mechanism for timing behavior. Is this market timing based on the 
asymmetric information between investors and managers (Korajczyk, Lucas and 
McDonald, 1991), or that managers capitalize on market inefficiency to time the 




4 A VAR model using individual REIT returns and market to book ratios is also estimated to further validate our 
findings. The results are supportive of market timing as well. 
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Table 2: Statistical Summary 
 Equity(mil 
$)  
Debt(mil $) A(mil $) M/B Stock 
Return 
NAREIT  SP I(%) TS (%) LEV 
 















Variation      175.618
 
 

















EQUITYt: Net change in equity of all REITs in quarter t; DEBTt : Net change in book value of total long-term debt of all REITs in quarter t; ASSETt: Size of the REIT at the 
end of the previous quarter (log value of total assets); AVMBt:  Average of the M/B ratio of all the equity REITs in quarter t; NAREITt: NAREIT equity REIT index return in 
quarter t; INTt: Long-term (10 year) interest rate in quarter t; S&Pt: S&P 500 composite index return in quarter t; TSt: Term-spread between long-term interest rate and short-
term interest rate (3-month T-bill rate) in quarter t; LEVt: Leverage ratio of the REIT at the end of the previous quarter t; 
 
Table 3-1: Correlation Matrix between Time Series Variables 
      EQUITY DEBT AVMB NAREIT SP I  TS
EQUITY 1 0.4240      -0.0856 0.0634 0.1180 -0.0867 -0.0502
DEBT       1 0.0359 -0.0922 -0.1646 0.0299 -0.1285
AVMB     1 0.3784 0.3396 -0.1720 0.0950
NAREIT      1 0.5211 -0.2735 0.1636
SP       1 -0.2626 -0.0329
I        1 -0.0202
TS       1 
Table 3-2: Correlation Matrix Between Cross Sectional Variables 
 LEV A DEBT DC STK_AP SVAR 
LEV 1 0.1118 0.2725 0.0885 0.0040 0.0037 
A  1 0.6339 -0.3749 -0.1456 -0.0739 
D   1 -0.1714 -0.0669 -0.0460 
DC    1 0.1755 0.0949 
STK_AP     1 0.4636 
SVAR      1 
 
EQUITY: equity of REIT i at end of previous quarter before equity/debt offering; DEBT book value of total 
long-term debt of REIT i; LEV: Leverage ratio of REIT i; ASSET: log value of total assets of REIT i; 
NAREIT: NAREIT equity REIT index return at end of previous quarter; INT: Long-term (10 year) interest 
rate at end of previous quarter; S&P: S&P 500 composite index return at end of previous quarter; TS: 
Term-spread between long-term interest rate and short-term interest rate (3-month T-bill rate) at end of 
previous quarter; DC: Debt capacity dummy variable that shows whether the debt capacity is reached when 
the new equity/debt issue is made; STK_AP: REIT stock price appreciation in the previous quarter; SVAR: 
Variance of the stock returns in the past year. 
 
 
Table 4: VAR Result  
 Vector Autoregression Estimates  
 t-statistics in [ ] 
 EQUITY DEBT NAREIT 
EQUITY(-1)  0.640776  0.789234  -6.25E-06 
 [ 5.80622] [ 4.15296] [-1.54966] 
    
EQUITY(-2) -0.059679  0.523798 -4.31E-06 
 [-0.47563] [ 2.42423] [-0.94040] 
    
DEBT(-1)  0.142964 -0.354120  9.49E-07 
 [ 2.38575] [-3.43176] [ 0.43320] 
    
DEBT(-2)  0.054676  0.093438 -6.40E-06 
 [ 0.91229] [ 0.90536] [-2.92207] 
    
NAREIT(-1)  8962.094  10102.36  0.179710 
 [ 1.97331] [ 1.17391] [ 0.98355] 
    
NAREIT(-2)  4592.650 -12442.16 -0.045231 
 [ 1.57053] [-2.47083] [-0.42305] 
    
C  323.3212  867.7837  0.004028 
 [ 0.86853] [ 1.35372] [ 0.29592] 
    
AVMB(-1) -3294.632 -13551.08 -0.208636 
 [-0.50763] [-1.21248] [-0.87923] 
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I(-1)  170.0800 - 531.1440 -0.005950 
 [ 0.54423] [ -1.98698] [-0.52074] 
    
TS(-1) -83.11531 -219.3183  0.008332 
 [-0.53043] [-0.81281] [ 1.45434] 
 R-squared  0.609366  0.552750  0.172755 
 Adj. R-squared  0.567512  0.504831  0.084122 
 
EQUITYt: Net change in equity of all REITs in quarter t; DEBTt : Net change in book value of total long-
term debt of all REITs in quarter t; AVMBt:  Average of the M/B ratio of all the equity REITs in quarter t; 
NAREITt: NAREIT equity REIT index return in quarter t; INTt: Long-term (10 year) interest rate in quarter 
t; TSt: Term-spread between long-term interest rate and short-term interest rate (3-month T-bill rate) in 
quarter t. 
 
4.2 Test the hypotheses of the information-based market 
timing 
 
In this part, three hypotheses under the information-based market timing theory are 
tested. The first hypothesis, central to the information-based market timing theory, is that 
stock prices are expected to fall on the announcement day since the equity issues are 
regarded as negative signals (Asquith and Mullins (1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986), 
and Barclay and Litzenberger (1988)).  
 
Hypothesis 1: Stock prices fall at the equity issue announcement 
 
Howe and Shilling (1988) examine the stock price reactions to the announcement of 
new security offerings by REITs from 1970-1985, and find a positive stock price reaction 
to debt offerings, and a negative stock price reaction to equity offerings. In this paper we 
use a more recent dataset to reconfirm and update the evidence. 
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 We calculate the gross stock return and the abnormal stock return on the 
announcement day. The abnormal return is the gross stock return minus the CRSP 
equally weighted return on the event day, excluding dividend. Table 5 shows that there is 
significant negative return on the announcement day. Further, we divide the whole study 
period into different decades and find that the returns on the announcement day are 
calculated for each decade. The result is shown in Table 5. The return is significantly 
negative after 1990. The insignificance before 1990’s may be caused by small sample 
size. 
 
Table 5: Event day return on announcement of equity offerings 
 
Panel A: Entire sample period 
 Average T-statistic N 

















Panel B: Gross return by sub-periods 








1980~1989 -0.00371 -1.125 15 
1990~1999 -0.00664*** -3.402 287 
2000~2004 -0.00624*** -3.589 122 
 
Panel C: Abnormal return by sub-periods 








1980~1989 -0.00387 -1.161 15 
1990~1999 -0.00747*** -3.721 287 
2000~2004 -0.00756*** -4.324 122 
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 The results above are consistent with the asymmetric information between REITs 
investors and managers explanation for negative stock reactions to equity offerings. The 
asymmetric information between the investors and managers is the underlying basis not 
only for market timing theory, but also the pecking-order theory. As we have noted 
earlier, the pecking-order theory implies that managers first use internal funds for 
investments, then debt, and equity is the last resort. As such, the prediction is that the 
market will react positively to debt issues and negatively for equity offerings. According 
to the market timing theory, there is no clear indication of the market reactions to the debt 
offerings. Debt issuances do not indicate that firms are facing good investment 
opportunities, but only that market conditions are favorable for debt origination. So 
studying the market reactions to the debt offerings of REITs is one way to differentiate 
between the two theories. A similar approach is utilized to study the event day return to 
debt issues. The results are shown in the following tables. We also calculate the event day 
returns in different decades. 
 
Table 6: Event day return on announcement of debt issues 
 



























Panel B: Gross return by sub-periods 








1980~1989 0.000437 0.080 7 
1990~1999 -0.00013 -0.120 184 
2000~2004 0.001510 1.491 135 
 
Panel C: Abnormal return by sub-periods 








1980~1989 -0.000623 -0.935 7 
1990~1999 -0.000728 -0.640 184 
2000~2004 -0.000294 -0.763 135 
 
 
In contrast to the significant negative market reactions to equity issues, the stock 
price reactions to debt issues are insignificant. Even if we split the data into different 
decades (Table 6 Panel B), the result is still similar. We do not find significant positive 
reactions as documented by Howe and Shilling (1988) after 1990. Such changes may 
come from the structural change of REITs during that period. 
 
What is clear is that investors consider REIT equity issues to be negative news, 
especially after 1990. On the other hand, debt issues do not have significant market 
reactions. For REITs investors, the debt issues of REITs may simply indicate that the 
firms are taking advantages of the low interest rate level, and the debt issues are not 
correlated with investment opportunities. The preceding evidence cast doubt on the 
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pecking-order theory, although information-based market timing is valid for equity 
REITs5.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Equity issues cluster after earnings releases 
 
This hypothesis is based on the time-varying asymmetric information in equity 
issues. As mentioned earlier, information-based market timing predicts that managers 
issue equity when their stocks are overvalued. Managers realize also that negative market 
reactions to the equity issues reduce the wealth of existing shareholders. Assuming that 
asymmetric information between investors and managers is time-varying, managers 
should issue equity when the market is most informed of the quality of the firm and when 
the cost of adverse selection is at its lowest. Quarterly earnings announcement is one of 
the most important sources of information, and we expect to observe clustering in equity 
issues shortly after earnings releases (in Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1991)).  
 
The lag between the equity issues and the latest quarterly earnings announcement is 
calculated for each secondary equity issues of REITs. We find that about 50% of the 
equity issues occur in 40 days after the quarterly earnings announcement. In contrast, 
75% of general stocks issue within 40 days. The distribution of the time lags is shown in 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Distribution of time lags between equity issues and the latest quarterly 
earnings announcement 
 
                                                 
5 Our result is robust to issuing activities with different purposes. Whether the issuing proceeds are used for investment 


























































       We further observe in Figure 2 a pattern of decreasing number of issues after the 
quarterly earnings announcement. However, this pattern is less obvious compared to 
general stocks. For example, the number of issues for general stocks that occurred more 
than 90 days after the announcement is about 20% of the number of issues that occurred 
in less than 7 days after the announcement (Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1991)), 
while for REITs, it is about 40%. For general stocks, the largest number of issues 
happens about 28 days after earnings announcement. The largest number of issues for 
REITs happens between 49 and 55 days, which is much later than general stocks.  
      
       In order to evaluate whether the above trend is consistent over time, we divide the 
study period into three stages: 1980~1990, 1990~ 2000 and 2000~2004. In Panel A of 
Figure 3, the percentage over issues for a particular window period is calculated. In 
addition, the percentage of issues over total issues across a particular sub-period is 
calculated in Panel B.  
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Figure 3: Distribution of time lags between equity issues and the latest quarterly 
earnings announcement in different decades 
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      The result shows that the differences between decades are not very obvious. Though 
the largest proportion of equity offerings occurs in one week after the quarterly earnings 
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announcement after 2000, the timing pattern of REITs is still not obvious compared to 
general stocks. 
 
Two explanations may account for this phenomenon. The first reason why REITs 
do not issue equity immediately after earnings announcement may be that the information 
conveyed in the announcement is negative news and managers would like to avoid equity 
issues soon after that. The second reason is that REITs suffer less from asymmetric 
information. To differentiate between the two reasons, we assume that the market is 
efficient and the market have fully reacted to the negative information on the earning 
announcement day, and divide the whole sample into three subgroups by the price 
reaction to earnings announcement: significantly positive, significantly negative and 
insignificant reactions. Then we analyze the time lag between earnings announcement 
and equity issuing announcement for earnings announcements with significantly positive 
returns and negative returns separately. If the equity issues follow positive earnings 
announcement more closely than follow negative earnings announcement, then the 
information in the earnings announcement would be a very important factor in 
determining the time lags. 
 
What we find in Table 7 is that the distribution of time lag between positive and 
negative news is not substantially different, especially if we use the abnormal return 
measure. In other words, the information contained in the earnings announcement does 
not influence the time lag between earnings announcement and equity issues after that. 
Since this could not explain the distribution lag for REITs, we infer by elimination that 
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the second postulated reason for the difference between REITs and general stocks – that 
REITs are expected to suffer less from asymmetric information – holds. Higher 
predictable cash flows (rents) and more stringent information disclosure requirements 
could be reasons why REITs equity offerings do not cluster around earnings 
announcements as closely as general stocks. This explanation is also valid when we 
compare the stock reactions of REITs (hypothesis 1) to equity issues with the reactions of 
general stocks and find that REITs have smaller reactions compared to general stocks. 
This implies that REITs may suffer less from information asymmetry. 
Table 7: Distribution of Time Lags  
 
Gross Return on the Earning 
Announcement Day 
Abnormal Return on the Earning 
Announcement Day 
Time Lags Negative Positive Negative Positive 
0～6 8.33% 9.21% 9.76% 8.81% 
7～13 9.72% 11.84% 10.37% 8.29% 
14～20 7.64% 9.87% 9.15% 6.22% 
21～27 9.72% 5.92% 6.71% 9.85% 
28～34 7.64% 9.21% 7.32% 7.77% 
35～41 10.42% 9.87% 9.76% 9.84% 
42～48 6.25% 10.53% 9.15% 6.74% 
49～55 9.03% 11.84% 9.15% 11.91% 
56～62 6.94% 4.61% 2.44% 8.81% 
63～69 3.47% 5.92% 6.10% 4.15% 
70～76 5.56% 6.58% 6.10% 4.66% 
77～83 6.94% 7.24% 8.54% 7.25% 
84～90 3.47% 3.95% 5.49% 1.55% 
〉90 4.86% 2.63% 3.05% 4.15% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
A corollary to the time-varying asymmetric information hypothesis is that the 
closer the issue announcement follows an earning release, the more informed is the 
market, and consequently the price drop at the issue day is expected to be smaller. In 
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Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1991), this hypothesis is supported using general 
stocks data. Similar to hypothesis 2, we test this using REIT data. A simple regression is 
run to test this relationship where the announcement day return is regressed on the days 
between earnings release and equity issue announcement date and a constant term. The 
results (available on request) show that there is no significant relationship between the lag 
of days and the price drop at the announcement day, in contrast with general stocks. This 
is consistent with what we find for hypothesis 2, that quarterly earnings release does not 
appear to be an important source of information for REITs equity offerings. This is 
consistent with the notion that the REIT industry operates under a lower degree of 
information asymmetry. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The closer the issue announcement follows an earning release, the smaller 
the price drop at the issue day 
 
Another important hypothesis of the time-varying asymmetric information is that the 
closer the issue announcement follows an earning release, the market is more informed, 
and the price drop at the issue day is expected to be smaller. In Korajczyk, Lucas and 
McDonald (1991), this hypothesis is supported using general stocks data. Similar to 
hypothesis 2, we test this using REITs data in this study. A simple regression is run here 
to test this relationship. Table 8 shows that there is no significant relationship between the 
lag of days and the price drop at the announcement day, which is different from general 
stocks. This is consistent with what we find in testing hypothesis 2, that quarterly 
earnings release is not an important source of information for REITs equity offerings. 
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 Table 8: Event Day Return Regression (with t statistic in parenthesis)6







Days between earning release and 





No. of observation 349 349 
R-square 0.00012 0.00446 
[***: significant at 1% confidence level] 
 
In this section, we find that the market reactions to capital issues of REITs support 
the existence of the asymmetric information in the market timing of REITs. Pecking-
order theory is not validated for REITs, although asymmetric information exists. 
Comparing the equity market timing pattern of REITs with general stocks, we find that 
the time-varying asymmetric information found from general stocks could not gain much 
support from REITs. One possible reason may be that REITs have less asymmetric 
information compared to general stocks, so some conclusions from general stocks may 
not be valid for REITs. 
 
In this section, we find that market reactions to REIT capital issues support the 
existence of the asymmetric information in the market timing of REITs. Support for the 
pecking-order theory is not strong, although asymmetric information exists. When we 
compare the equity market timing pattern of REITs with general stocks, we find that the 
time-varying asymmetric information found in general stocks is not as strongly supported 
in the REIT industry. One possible reason may be that REITs operate under less 
asymmetric information. 
                                                 
6 As some of the issues do not have relevant data, the sample size here is reduced to 349.  
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4.3 Market efficiency and market timing in REIT equity 
offerings 
 
The inefficiency-based market timing explanation has been supported by prior 
research. Post IPO long run underperformance for general stocks is believed to challenge 
the concept of market efficiency. Managers time equity offerings to take the advantage of 
market inefficiency. Asymmetric information between investors and managers is not 
required here. What matters is the market timing ability of managers. In other words, 
long-run underperformance from REIT SEOs would challenge the notion market 
efficiency for REITs.  
 
Generally there are two methodologies when researchers calculate long-run 
performance. The first method is used by Ritter (1991), whereby returns are compared 
with out-of-sample assets. The second method is the Fama and French (1993) three factor 
model. Since most of the REITs have offerings during the study period, the second 
method is applied to test for abnormal returns. A four-factor model that includes the 
momentum variable in Carhart (1997) is estimated. 
 
The portfolios are formed comprising REITs that issued equity over the previous 
five years. The study period is January 1980 to March 2004. The average monthly return 
of REITs that have equity issues in the past five years is calculated for each month. Both 
value-weighted and equally-weighted monthly returns are calculated. Then the abnormal 
monthly return for each portfolio is regressed against the three Fama and French (1993) 
 47
equity risk factors, Market, SMB, and HML, Carhart’s (1997) momentum variable, and 
the return on the NAREIT index minus the risk-free rate. The NAREIT index return is 
added to mimic the risk in returns specifically related to the real estate industry (Buttimer, 
Hyland and Sanders, 2005). We first use the above four factors in the regression, then the 
NAREIT index is included. 
 










21 )()(                                                                               
(6) 
tREIT : The value-weighted (equally-weighted) return in quarter t of REITs with equity 
offering in the last 5 years; 
tRf : Risk-free rate in quarter t; 
tNAREIT : Return of NAREIT equity REIT index in quarter t; 
tMarket : Value-weighted CRSP returns in quarter t; 
tSMB : The difference between the returns on small and big stock portfolios with about 
the same book to market equity in quarter t; 
tHML : The difference between the returns on high book-market firms and low book-
market firms in quarter t; 
tMomentum : The high momentum stock return minus low momentum stock return where 
momentum is measured based on past one-year return. Here 
and  are calculated on all stocks in CRSP. tSMB tHML tMomentum
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 Significant long-run underperformance is found only in equal weighted four factor 
regression (result in Table 9). When NAREIT return is included in the regression, the 
explanatory power of the equations increase, both in equal and value weighted portfolios. 
At the same time, adding NAREIT return into the equation decreases the explanatory 
power of other variables. If we compare equally weighted regression with value weighted 
regression, we find that the intercept in value weighted regression is larger than in equally 
weighted. The reason may be that larger REITs have better performance compared to 
small REITs. In the last column of panel A of Table 9, the intercept becomes positive. 
 
Table 9: Long-run performance calculation  
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 
  
Equally Weighted Sample 
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Panel B: Large REITs 
  
Equally Weighted Sample 
 





     0.387785 





























































(with t statistic in parenthesis) 
[***: significant at 1% confidence level] 
 
Rft: Risk-free rate in quarter t; Markett: Value-weighted CRSP returns in quarter t;  SMBt: Difference 
between the returns on small and big stock portfolios with about the same book to market equity in quarter t; 
HMLt: Difference between the returns on high book-market firms and low book-market firms in quarter t; 
Momentumt: High momentum stock return minus low momentum stock return where momentum is 
measured based on past one-year return; NAREITt: NAREIT equity REIT index return in quarter t. 
 
Recall in Graham and Harvey (2001) that large firms practice market timing more 
frequently than smaller firms. As such, it may be possible that we could not find evidence 
of underperformance because small REITs are not good at market timing. So could the 
phenomenon hold for large REITs? 
 
We sort all observations according to total market value and include only the top 
quintile (the quintile containing the largest REITs) and calculate the long-run 
performance for large REITs. The results (Panel B of Table 9) continue to indicate that 
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there is no evidence of long-run underperformance for large REITs 7 . One major 
difference between the results in Panel A and Panel B is that the variable NAREIT-Rf 
becomes insignificant in Panel B. This may be because the NAREIT index is not a good 
proxy for large REITs, so the NAREIT index return is not significant in Panel B. 
Alternatively, we may interpret that large REITs behave more like general stocks, but not 
so for smaller REITs. 
 
Our result is consistent with Buttimer, Hyland and Sanders (2005), in which long-
run underperformance from REITs IPO data is not found. Since both positive and 
negative concepts exist in our result, the argument in Fama (1998) is valid – that the 
finding of long-run underperformance is not robust. Thus the market efficiency is not 
violated8. 
 
In summary, we examine the equity market timing behavior of REITs by testing 
hypotheses of information-based market timing and market inefficiency-based market 
timing. Our results show that asymmetric information exists between REITs managers 
and investors, although less obvious compared to general stocks. On the other hand, 
market efficiency is not challenged by REIT SEOs. This implies that information-based 
market timing is supported by REITs. 
 
4.4 Market timing in REIT debt issuances 
                                                 
7 Similar test is also carried out for small REITs and no evidence of underperformance is found. 
8 In Howton, Howton and Friday (2000), it is found that equity REITs underperformed an index of non-issuing REITs 
for three years. Using the same time period (1990-1996) with value-weighted sample and the four-factor model as 
above, we could not find underperformance.  
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This section examines debt market timing for REITs. Graham and Harvey’s 
survey (2001) concludes that companies try to time market interest rates by issuing more 
debt when they feel that interest rates are low. Barry, et al. (2005) find empirical support 
for this relation. Specifically, we test two perspectives of debt market timing: “backward-
looking” timing and “forward-looking” timing. These are tested in Hypotheses 4 and 5. 
 
Hypothesis 4: (Backward-Looking) The amount of debt issues of REITs is correlated 
with the level of interest rates and their relation to historical rates. 
 
To test this hypothesis, we define the dependent variable as the total amount (log 
value) of debt issued by individual REIT in a quarter (AMT). If there are several debt 
issues in the same quarter, then the total amount is calculated. Independent variables 
include interest rate and other variables. This test is different from the earlier VAR model 
test for debt market timing; now we focus on the actual amount of debt issued instead of 
the net change in the debt value. 
 
Barry, et al. (2005) find that the amount and number of debt issues are higher 
when current interest rate is lower compared to historical interest rates. In order to test 
this, both the interest rate levels and its rank related to historical rates are included as 
independent variables. Here we adopt the concept of the interest rank (IR), which is the 
ranking of the current interest level relative to historical rates (Barry, et al., 2005). The 
key idea is that managers form expectations on the basis of mean reversion in interest 
rates and future interest rates are likely to fall at some time in the future if the current 
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interest rates are high, vice versa. If so, the historical rank of the current interest rate is an 
important indicator of debt market conditions. To calculate the historical rank of the 





where Xt is the current interest rate. Max and Min are the highest and lowest interest rates 
in the past ten years respectively.  
IRANK is assigned the value of: 
 1  if 0 ≤ IR ≤ 1 
 2  if 1 < IR  ≤ 2 
… 
10   if 9 < IR ≤ 10. 
 
As noted earlier, Guedes and Opler (1996) find that term spread is negatively 
related to debt issues, and term spread is also included in the equation. The equity REIT 
price index return from NAREIT and S&P 500 index return are also included to control 
for the equity market conditions, which may have influence on the debt issuing activities. 
Graham and Harvey (2001) show that market timing is important for large firms, so 
variables that represent for firm characteristics (size, leverage) are also included. 
 
A simple OLS regression is run to test this hypothesis and the results are given 
below. Both the level of interest rate (INT) and the historical rank of interest rate (IRANK) 
have negative effects on the amount of debt issues, but interestingly, it is only the ranking 
of the interest rate that has a significant effect on the amount of issues and not the interest 
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rate level. Barry, et al. (2005) find that both the interest rate level and the ranking of 
interest rates are significant. However, they use monthly data instead of our quarterly as 
in our analysis. This may lead to different significances of interest rate levels between 
Barry, et al. (2005) and our result. We can also find that larger REITs tend to issue more 
debt and REITs with higher leverage ratio issue less debt, both of which are consistent 
with our expectations.  
 
Table 10: Effect of Interest Rate and Interest Rank on REIT Debt Offering 
 
variable coefficient t-statistic 
intercept 1.5292*** 2.670 
INT -0.0063 -0.139 
IRANK -0.1418*** -2.991 
TS 0.1696*** 3.554 
NAREIT -1.3481 -1.471 
S&P -0.5129 -0.875 
ASSET 0.4729*** 7.916 
LEV -1.0394** -2.254 
R square: 0.330209 
***: significant at 1% confidence level 
**: significant at 5% confidence level 
*: significant at 10% confidence level 
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IRANK: ranking of prevailing interest rate level in quarter of issue; ASSET: log value of total assets of 
REIT i at end of previous quarter; NAREIT: NAREIT equity REIT index return at end of previous quarter; 
INT: Long-term (10 year) interest rate at end of previous quarter; S&P: S&P 500 composite index return at 
end of previous quarter; TS: Term-spread between long-term interest rate and short-term interest rate (3-
month T-bill rate) at end of previous quarter; LEV: Leverage ratio of REIT i at end of previous quarter. 
 
Hypothesis 5: (Forward-Looking) Debt issuing decisions are followed by interest rate 
movements that demonstrate manager’s ability to time future interest rates. 
This hypothesis differs from the previous hypothesis in that we test the “forward-
looking” timing ability of REITs managers. Put differently, if the interest rate rises after 
debt issues, then forward-looking market timing exists. To test this hypothesis, we 
examine whether interest rates rise on average after debt issues. We define  as the 
long-term interest rate at n months after the issuance minus the long-term interest rate at 
the issuance. 
0II n −
Table 11: Interest Rates Subsequent to Debt Issues 
(I: % per annum) 
 06 II −  012 II −  018 II −  024 II −  030 II −  
Average 0.032 0.024 -0.004 -0.015 -0.029** 
t statistic 0.987 1.237 1.221 0.769 2.083 
 
In Table 11, we find that interest rates do not rise after issuances. Instead, they 
even fall after issuances. This result indicates that managers of REITs do not have the 
“forward-looking” timing ability which could allow them to issue debt before interest 
rates rise. 
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 Chapter 5 
 
Security Choice of REITs Offerings 
 
Now that we have established market timing in REIT equity and debt offerings, we 
proceed to test all three capital structure theories through analyzing the security choice 
between debt and equity in REIT offerings. Different capital structure theories have 
different assumptions and explanations with regard to the security choice between equity 
and debt. We restrict our test to the information-based market timing theory. As we have 
explained, one major difference between this market timing theory and the pecking-order 
theory is whether there is a pecking-order in the financing decision-making. Another 
difference is the effect of the market conditions on security offerings is considered to be 
important in market timing theory.  
 
      We use a probit model to test the security choice of REITs. The study period covers 
1980-2004. The dependent variable is zero if equity is issued in one quarter, and is one if 
debt is issued, conditional on one type of security being issued in the quarter. 
Independent variables include proxies of cost of capital and firm characteristics.  
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The independent variables include9: 
 
(1) Market to Book ratio (M/B): The trade-off theory implies that higher M/B ratio is 
correlated with higher growth opportunities, and higher costs of financial distress. 
Thus less debt is used when the M/B is high, i.e. debt is negatively correlated with 
M/B.. The pecking-order theory states that high growth firms with high M/B ratio 
need more external capital. Since debt is preferred to equity, high growth firms 
would end up with high leverage ratio and more debt. So debt is positively correlated 
with M/B. In the market timing theory, M/B ratio is negatively correlated with debt 
and leverage.  
 
(2) Total assets (ASSET): According to the trade-off theory, size related variables, such 
as total assets are inverse proxies for volatility and for costs of bankruptcy. The 
larger the firm, the higher the leverage ratio. The implication from the pecking-order 
theory is not very clear. This is because on the one hand, larger firms might have 
more assets in place and thus a greater damage if adverse selection happens; on the 
other hand, larger firms may have less asymmetric information compared to small 
firms. The market timing theory has no specific assumptions about the size of firms 
and the security choice. 
 
(3) Leverage (LEV) 
 
                                                 
9 Here all the variables are calculated using the previous quarter data. We also extend our analysis into the previous two 
quarters and the previous four quarters and the results are similar. 
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(4) Stock price appreciation (ST_AP): The market timing theory assumes that the higher 
the stock price appreciation in the recent period, the higher probability that equity is 
issued by firms to take advantage of the appreciation. 
 
(5) Total debt (DEBT) 
 
(6) S & P 500 return (SP)  
 
(7) NAREIT return (NAREIT) 
 
(8)  Interest rate (INT): Debt market timing implies that firms choose debt if the current 
interest rate is comparatively low, so lower interest rate increases the probability of a 
debt issue. 
 
(9) Term spread (TS): If the long-term interest rate is considered to be low compared to 
the short-tem rate, then firms would choose more long-term debt according to the 
market timing theory. 
 
(10) Debt capacity (DC): If the debt capacity is reached, then it equals one. Otherwise, it 
is zero. According to the pecking-order theory, when the debt capacity has been 
reached, firms will choose equity. Otherwise, debt is preferred to equity. 
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(11) Stock variance (SVAR): The trade-off theory implies that firms with more volatile 
cash flows face higher expected costs of financial distress and therefore use less debt. 
The implication from the pecking-order theory is that firms with volatile stocks are 
firms about which beliefs are quite volatile. They would suffer more adverse 
selection, and will use more debt and have higher leverage ratios. 
 
(12) Property type dummy variables.  
 
      As there may be several debt issues for an individual REIT in the same quarter, 
multiple issues are aggregated. At the same time, only one type of issue for each REIT is 
allowed in each quarter (equity or debt) in the probit model. Cases where both equity and 
debt are issued in one quarter are excluded. In total, 20 REITs issue duplicate securities 
and theses are excluded from the sample and such excluded data represents less than 10% 
of the entire data sample10. After reduction of these issues and other issues which do not 
have relevant data, the final sample comprises 324 equity issues and 220 debt issues. 
 
The result of the probit model11 in Table 12 shows that, stock price appreciation 
(STK_AP) and long-term interest rates (INT) have significant effects on the equity/debt 
choice of REITs. When the stock prices are increasing and when long-term interest is 
high, REITs prefer equity to debt. 
 
                                                 
10 The result of the probit model does not change when we include the net amount of these 20 issues in our sample. If 
we use the net issue, these 20 issues reduce to 6 net equity issues and 14 net debt issues. 
11 A logit model is also applied here to examine the security choice of REITs, and give similar results as the probit 
model. The detailed results of the logit model are shown in in Appendix. 
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Table 12: Probit Regression 
Dependent Variable: SECURITY CHOICE 
(zero if equity is issued in one quarter, and one if debt is issued)  
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
      
constant -2.8273*** 1.0358 -2.7297 0.006 
ASSET 0.4251*** 0.1165 3.6505 0.000 
DEBT -3.10E-05 0.0001 -0.4418 0.659 
DC -0.9462*** 0.1452 -6.5155 0.000 
INT -0.7465*** 0.2873 -2.5985 0.009 
LEV -1.1427** 0.5359 -2.1321 0.033 
M/B 0.3898 0.2474 1.5757 0.115 
NAREIT -1.0157 1.3286 -0.7645 0.445 
S&P -0.0714 0.7927 -0.0900 0.928 
STK_AP -2.1435*** 0.7613 -2.8157 0.005 
SVAR -6.9950 10.9830 -0.6369 0.524 
TS 0.0510 0.0595 0.8584 0.391 
DIVERSIFIED -0.1703 0.2630 -0.6464 0.518 
HEALTH_CARE 0.6229** 0.2442 2.5512 0.011 
INDUSTRIAL_OFFICE -0.1092 0.1837 -0.5945 0.552 
LODGING_RESORTS -0.3720 0.3316 -1.1216 0.262 
RESIDENTIAL 0.5596*** 0.1895 2.9521 0.003 
SELF_STORAGE -0.3497 0.5445 -0.6423 0.521 
SPECIALTY 1.1683* 0.6216 1.8797 0.060 
Obs with Dep=0 324 Total obs  544 
Obs with Dep=1 220    
***: significant at 1% confidence level; **: significant at 5% confidence level; *: 
significant at 10% confidence level 
 
ASSET: log value of total assets of REIT i at end of previous quarter; DEBT book value of total long-term 
debt of REIT i at end of previous quarter; LEV: Leverage ratio of REIT i at end of previous quarter; DC: 
Debt capacity dummy variable that shows whether the debt capacity is reached when the new equity/debt 
issue is made; INT: Long-term (10 year) interest rate at end of previous quarter; MB : Market-to-book ratio 
at end of previous quarter; NAREIT: NAREIT equity REIT index return at end of previous quarter; S&P: 
S&P 500 composite index return at end of previous quarter; STK_AP: REIT stock price appreciation in the 
previous quarter; SVAR: Variance of the stock returns in the past year; TS: Term-spread between long-term 




Higher S&P 500 index return and NAREIT index return both decrease the 
probability of making debt issues but the coefficients are not significant. Baker and 
Wurgler (2000) suggest that firms have the ability to time the whole capital market, and 
the equity share in the total equity and debt issues could be used to predict future market 
returns. Higher equity share would lead to lower market returns. Our result shows, in 
contrast, that higher individual REIT returns have significant effect on the security choice 
of REITs, but general market variables do not have significant effects. It seems that 
individual REIT stock return is more important than the overall market conditions in the 
timing behavior of REITs.  
 
Size (ASSET) is an important variable that has influence on the security choice of 
REITs, as shown in Table 12. Larger REITs have higher probability of debt issues 
compared to smaller REITs. Such evidence supports the trade-off theory, as larger REITs 
tend to have lower bankruptcy risk and thus could afford higher debt levels. Higher stock 
return variance (SVAR) has negative effect on the probability of a debt issue, but the 
effect is not significant. The sign of effect is consistent with the trade-off theory, as the 
trade-off theory implies that firms with more volatile cash flows face higher expected 
costs of financial distress and therefore use less debt. This is inconsistent with the 
prediction of the pecking-order theory that firms with volatile stocks face more adverse 
selection and use more debt. 
 
The result on debt capacity constraint (DC) shows logically that there would be 
less debt offering when debt capacity is reached. This lends support to not only the 
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pecking-order theory, but also the trade-off theory. Leverage ratio (LEV) has significantly 
negative effects on the probability of debt issues. On the other hand, the total amount of 
debt (DEBT) has an insignificant effect, although the sign is also negative. This is rational 
as the amount of debt may vary greatly across firms because of different sizes of firms, 
but the leverage ratio is a relatively consistent variable. Thus the leverage ratio has 
significant effect, but not the total amount of debt. Since the leverage ratio is not 
irrelevant to the market timing theory, further support is found for the trade-off theory.  
 
M/B ratio is believed to be an indicator of the valuation of firms under the market 
timing theory. Higher M/B ratio means overvaluation while lower M/B ratio means 
undervaluation. If managers wish to time the market by issuing equity when stocks are 
overvalued, then higher M/B ratio will lead to more equity issues. In table 12, it is shown 
that higher M/B ratio increases the probability of debt issues (although only at 11% 
significance), but not equity issues. This is contrary to the prediction of the market timing 
theory. One possible explanation for this result is that M/B ratio is not necessarily a good 
indicator of the valuation of REITs. Sometimes it is believed that M/B ratio could not 
differentiate between the growth of the firms and the overvaluation of the firms (Lee, 
Myers and Swaminathan, 1999; Kothari and Shanken, 1997). If the M/B ratio is a proxy 
for growth opportunities rather than stock valuation, then the preference for debt when 
REITs have access to high growth opportunities supports the pecking-order theory. The 
trade-off theory, in postulating that higher growth firms uses less debt, is not supported 
by our result. 
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We also find that REITs prefer debt to equity when the term-spread (TS) is high, 
although the effect is not significant. A high term-spread can be explained by a higher 
expected interest rate in the future, and REITs would use more debt at present to avoid 
future financial needs. As leverage ratio is positively correlated with bankrupt risk, 
managers of REITs would not choose debt issues when the current leverage ratio is high, 
or when there is a lack of good investment opportunities. However, REITs that have 
larger holding assets could issue more debt. It is reasonable to infer that higher leverage 
ratio is considered to be risky for REITs, and this may be the reason why most REITs 
keep their leverage ratio in an acceptable level (such as 40% to 60%)12. 
 
Property type also has an important influence on the security choice of REITs. 
Health care and residential REITs have higher probability to offer debt relative to REITs 
from other sectors. This could be due to stable cash flows and assets values of health care 
and residential REITs, which in turn increase the debt capacity and reduce the public debt 
costs.  
 
Table 13 summarizes the above results to facilitate comparison. The analysis of 
the security choice of REITs in this section shows that both equity and debt market 
conditions are important determinants of the capital structure changes of REITs. Despite 
the importance of the market timing theory, the other two capital structure theories, trade-
off theory and pecking-order theory, also could be used to explain the capital structure 
changes of REITs, although only partial support is found for the two theories. 
                                                 
12 According to NAREIT(www.nareit.com), the levels of leverage for REITs are moderate in recent years, consistent 
with our findings. 
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 Table 13: Summary of the predictions of different capital structure theories 
(+: debt issues; -: equity issues) 
*: significant at 5% level 






M/B － ＋ － ＋ 
A ＋   ＋* 
ST_AP   － －* 
S & P   － － 
NAREIT    － － 
SVAR － ＋  － 
I   － －* 
TS   － － 
LEV －   －* 
D －   － 
DC  －  －* 
 
ASSET: log value of total assets; DEBT : book value of total long-term debt; DC: Debt capacity dummy 
variable that shows whether the debt capacity is reached when the new equity/debt issue is made; INT: 
Long-term (10 year) interest rate; LEV: Leverage ratio of the REIT at the end of the previous quarter; MB : 
Market-to-book ratio; NAREIT: NAREIT equity REIT index return in quarter; S&P: S&P 500 composite 
index return in quarter; STK_AP: REIT stock price appreciation in the previous quarter; SVAR: Variance of 
the stock returns in the past year; TS: Term-spread between long-term interest rate and short-term interest 








 Chapter 6  
 
Conclusion 
   
REITs have always been considered as special investment vehicles because of 
their different institutional structure, and are usually excluded from general stocks in 
empirical studies. However, the REIT industry has a heavy dependence on capital due to 
special requirements on dividend payout. Because REITs are required to pay out at least 
90% of the distributable dividends to their investors, there would less retained earnings 
available for asset acquisitions. At the same time, equity REITs have higher predictability 
in their future cash flow as the main source of revenue is rent, thus information is 
expected to be less asymmetric in REITs. Also, the holding assets of REITs are mostly 
tangible assets. Given these characteristics, would the phenomenon of market timing 
found in general stocks apply for REITs as well?  
 
In this paper, we evaluate both equity and debt market timing of REITs from 1980 
through 2004. In addition, hypotheses from both the information-based and market 
inefficiency-based equity market timing are tested to see which theory could be used to 
explain the equity market timing of REITs. Both short-term and long-term performances 
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of REITs around capital issues are analyzed. Last but not least, to understand the capital 
structure changes of REITs more clearly, we include three capital structure theories 
(trade-off theory, pecking order and market timing) in our probit model to test the 
financing pattern and security choice of REITs.  
 
First, we find that market timing exists for REIT equity and debt issues using the 
VAR approach. REITs seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) usually occur when stock prices 
are high, supporting market timing behavior. Debt market timing is also supported in that 
increasing interest rates reduces debt offerings. We also find support for the market 
timing theory under the asymmetric information framework from examining the short-
term performance of REITs around capital issues. The stock price decreases on equity 
offering, but the timing of the equity issues is less obvious compared to general stocks. 
There is no relationship between the issue day price drop and the timing of the issues.  
 
Interestingly, we do not find evidence of long-run underperformance after REIT 
SEOs. This is different from what is found in general stocks and an earlier study by 
Howton, et al. (2000). We find that the REIT market is efficient in that market efficiency 
is not violated by the long-run return anomaly after SEOs, as in the case for general 
stocks. All these evidences suggest that although REITs also exhibit market timing 
behavior, the timing of such equity issues is different from general stocks both in the 
long-run and short-run. The different institutional structure and requirements of REITs 
may be one of the reasons for these differences. 
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Two debt market timing hypotheses – backward-looking and forward-looking – 
are tested. What we find is that the historical rankings of interest rates are important 
determinants of the debt issuing activities of REITs, supporting backward-looking debt 
market timing. But the data does not support the forward-looking debt market timing 
hypothesis in that interest rates do not rise after debt issuances by REITs. Validation of 
such differences in market timing abilities for general stocks would be an interesting 
extension. 
 
Our findings imply that the capital structure changes of REITs are indeed 
influenced by the market timing behavior, but in a different manner from that for general 
stocks. REITs managers time the equity market to reduce the adverse selection between 
investors and managers. This result is in contrast with that for general stocks, where the 
long-run underperformance implies that the market inefficiency-based market timing is 
more likely to be true. The debt offering decisions of REITs are also influenced by 
market conditions. In addition, traditional capital structure theories also play a role in 
explaining this.  
 
The analysis of the security choice between equity and debt issues shows that the 
market conditions are important factors. In particular, increasing stock prices and higher 
long-run interest rates increases the probability of equity issues. This is consistent with 
the market timing theory. The pecking-order theory is supported by the effect of debt 
capacity on the debt-equity choice of REITs.  The trade-off theory is supported by the 
effects of size, and leverage ratio. The body of evidence indicates that the security choice 
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and capital structure changes of REITs could not be explained by only one theory. It is 
reasonable to believe that REITs try to time the capital market when making financing 
decisions while keeping the leverage ratio away from excessively high levels at the same 
time. Normally, larger REITs and REITs with less stock return variance use more debt. 
Although the pecking-order theory could not be fully rejected by our study, it seems that 
there is no pecking order that prefers debt to equity in the security choice of REITs. We 
conclude that there is no single theory that fully explains the capital structure of REITs. 
 
Among our findings, there seem to be some conflicting facts. One seemingly 
conflicting result is that we find the evidence of the market timing behavior of REITs 
managers, in other words, managers would issue equity when stock prices are high, but 
we do not find the clustering of equity issues shortly after earnings releases. As we have 
mentioned, one explanation is the special characteristics of REITs, in other words, less 
asymmetric information is expected between managers and investors. Thus the earnings 
announcement does not convey as much information as general stocks. However, another 
possible explanation would be the debt constraints of REITs. As we find in the probit 
model for the security choice of REITs, REITs managers tend to issue equity more when 
debt capacity is already reached. If debt constraints are reached and the stock prices are 
high, managers would time the market. When the earnings announcements are released 
when the debt capacity is not reached, there would be no clustering of equity issues 
shortly after that. 
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      Another potential conflict in our findings is that we do not find evidence of long-run 
underperformance after REITs SEOs. From the perspective of the market efficiency, we 
claim that the market efficiency could not be challenged by REITs equity offerings and 
the market could make adjustment to prices quickly. So there is no long-run 
underperformance.  
 
      The debt constraint explanation could also explain the different market reactions to 
equity and debt issues of REITs. The market reacts negatively to equity issues of REITs, 
but not to debt issues. This seems to be consistent with the pecking-order theory, but not 
the market timing theory. However, when debt constraint is a concern, timing behavior 
would only occur when the debt constraint is reached. This means that when debt 
constraint is not binding, firms would first resort to debt and then equity. The market 
would react as the pecking order theory describes. But timing behavior would occur when 
the debt capacity is reached. This further implies that no single theory could explain the 
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Table 14: Logit Regression  
Dependent Variable: SECURITY_CHOICE  
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1 544   
Included observations: 544   
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations  
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
C -4.637672 1.817644 -2.551475 0.0107 
A 0.711227 0.202062 3.519839 0.0004 
DC -1.606534 0.251877 -6.378250 0.0000 
D -4.95E-05 0.000121 -0.410687 0.6813 
I -1.366165 0.508330 -2.687553 0.0072 
LEV -1.981662 0.923103 -2.146740 0.0318 
MB 0.639985 0.436353 1.466668 0.1425 
NAREIT -1.460663 2.293518 -0.636866 0.5242 
SP -0.078159 1.359346 -0.057497 0.9541 
STK_AP -3.943112 1.389882 -2.837011 0.0046 
SVAR -10.76740 19.25494 -0.559202 0.5760 
TS 0.072244 0.100501 0.718834 0.4722 
DIVERSIFIED -0.467711 0.468647 -0.998003 0.3183 
HEALTH_CARE 0.945748 0.417148 2.267179 0.0234 
INDUSTRIAL_OFFICE -0.194388 0.310914 -0.625213 0.5318 
LODGING_RESORTS -0.615040 0.567570 -1.083637 0.2785 
RESIDENTIAL 0.917706 0.322182 2.848411 0.0044 
SELF_STORAGE -0.702490 0.951329 -0.738430 0.4603 
SPECIALTY 1.893371 1.006821 1.880544 0.0600 
Mean dependent var 0.404412     S.D. dependent var 0.491230 
S.E. of regression 0.409095     Akaike info criterion 1.045296 
Sum squared resid 87.86335     Schwarz criterion 1.195443 
Log likelihood -265.3206     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.103999 
Restr. log likelihood -367.0694     Avg. log likelihood -0.487722 
LR statistic (18 df) 203.4977     McFadden R-squared 0.277192 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000    
Obs with Dep=0 324      Total obs 544 
Obs with Dep=1 220    
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 Table 15: Equity Market Capitalization Outstanding  
(Millions of dollars at year end) 




















1971 34 1,494.3 12 332.0 12 570.8 10 591.6 
1972 46 1,880.9 17 377.3 18 774.7 11 728.9 
1973 53 1,393.5 20 336.0 22 517.3 11 540.2 
1974 53 712.4 19 241.9 22 238.8 12 231.7 
1975 46 899.7 12 275.7 22 312.0 12 312.0 
1976 62 1,308.0 27 409.6 22 415.6 13 482.8 
1977 69 1,528.1 32 538.1 19 398.3 18 591.6 
1978 71 1,412.4 33 575.7 19 340.3 19 496.4 
1979 71 1,754.0 32 743.6 19 377.1 20 633.3 
1980 75 2,298.6 35 942.2 21 509.5 19 846.8 
1981 76 2,438.9 36 977.5 21 541.3 19 920.1 
1982 66 3,298.6 30 1,071.4 20 1,133.4 16 1,093.8 
1983 59 4,257.2 26 1,468.6 19 1,460.0 14 1,328.7 
1984 59 5,085.3 25 1,794.5 20 1,801.3 14 1,489.4 
1985 82 7,674.0 37 3,270.3 32 3,162.4 13 1,241.2 
1986 96 9,923.6 45 4,336.1 35 3,625.8 16 1,961.7 
1987 110 9,702.4 53 4,758.5 38 3,161.4 19 1,782.4 
1988 117 11,435.2 56 6,141.7 40 3,620.8 21 1,672.6 
1989 120 11,662.2 56 6,769.6 43 3,536.3 21 1,356.3 
1990 119 8,737.1 58 5,551.6 43 2,549.2 18 636.3 
1991 138 12,968.2 86 8,785.5 28 2,586.3 24 1,596.4 
1992 142 15,912.0 89 11,171.1 30 2,772.8 23 1,968.1 
1993 189 32,158.7 135 26,081.9 32 3,398.5 22 2,678.2 
1994 226 44,306.0 175 38,812.0 29 2,502.7 22 2,991.3 
1995 219 57,541.3 178 49,913.0 24 3,395.4 17 4,232.9 
1996 199 88,776.3 166 78,302.0 20 4,778.6 13 5,695.8 
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1997 211 140,533.8 176 127,825.3 26 7,370.3 9 5,338.2 
1998 210 138,301.4 173 126,904.5 28 6,480.7 9 4,916.2 
1999 203 124,261.9 167 118,232.7 26 4,441.7 10 1,587.5 
2000 189 138,715.4 158 134,431.0 22 1,632.0 9 2,652.4 
2001 182 154,898.6 151 147,092.1 22 3,990.5 9 3,816.0 
2002 176 161,937.3 149 151,271.5 20 7,146.4 7 3,519.4 
2003 171 224,211.9 144 204,800.4 20 14,186.51 7 5,225.0 
2004 193 307,894.73 153 275,291.04 33 25,964.32 7 6,639.37 
 
 
Figure 4: NAREIT equity REITs price index 

































Figure 5: S & P 500 price index 

















































































































Figure 6: 10-Year Government Bond Yield 
10-Year Government Bond Yield Data
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